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Cooperation in teams: the role of identity, punishment and endowment distribution 
 
 
 
Qian Weng*, Fredrik Carlsson† 
 
 
Abstract 
Common identity and peer punishment have been identified as important means to reduce free riding 
and to promote cooperation in teamwork settings. This paper examines the relative importance of 
these two mechanisms, as well as the importance of income distribution in team cooperation. In a 
repeated public good experiment, conditions vary among different combinations of homogenous or 
heterogeneous endowment, strong or weak identity, and absence or presence of peer punishment. We 
find that without punishment, strong identity can counteract the negative impact of endowment 
heterogeneity on cooperation. Moreover, punishment increases cooperation irrespective of income 
distribution and identity strength, and cooperation is similar across all treatments with punishment. 
These findings provide important implications for management policy makers in organizations: 
implementing ex ante income heterogeneity within teams should be done with caution, and a very 
strong peer punishment mechanism is more effective in enhancing cooperation over common identity 
when both are viable.  
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1. Introduction 
Teams have been increasingly viewed as an important way to enhance the efficiency of organizations 
and firms. One common underlying philosophy of successful teams is to foster cooperation among 
their members (Che and Yoo, 2001). However, organizations face several challenges to efficient 
teamwork. The benefits of working as a team may be undercut by the incentives to free ride, which 
cannot be completely controlled through formal contracts if compensation is based on team output 
rather than personal input (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). Experiments have shown that cooperation 
typically cannot be sustained by intrinsic altruistic motives alone (e.g., Andreoni, 1995; Fischbacher et 
al., 2001; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010). Rather, (centrally) building a common identity among 
employees and allowing (decentralized) mutual monitoring and sanctioning of team members have 
been considered effective attempts to discipline free riding and to promote cooperation in teamwork 
settings. Social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979, 1985) has received growing interest in the 
organizational literature (see, e.g., Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2005, 2008). A number of experiments 
have shown that salient identification with an organization or a team can increase cooperation (e.g., 
Eckel and Grossman, 2005; McLeish and Oxoby, 2008).1 Punishment, in terms of both pecuniary 
consequences such as reduced salaries and non-pecuniary ones such as social pressure and 
disapproval, has also been shown to be an important means to increase cooperation (Fehr and Gächter, 
2000b, 2002; Masclet et al., 2003; Kandel and Lazear, 1992; Mas and Moretti, 2009).2 
An additional aspect of teams is that they are often composed of individuals who are unequal in 
productivity, ability, and motivation. Payments tend to be differentiated partly to induce greater 
individual effort and partly to incentivize employees contributing to team output to stay away from 
distinct outside options (Balafoutas et al., 2010). Previous experiments investigating the role of 
income distribution in cooperation have shown mixed results – Cherry et al. (2005) report a negative 
effect of heterogeneity on aggregate cooperation, Chan et al. (1996), Visser and Burns (2006), and 
Prediger (2011) find the opposite, and Hofmeyr et al. (2007) find no significant difference. However, 
when it comes to individual behavior in unequal income teams, low-income people are ubiquitously 
found to cooperate relatively more than their high-income counterparts (e.g., Buckley and Croson, 
2006; van Dijk et al., 2002). Some studies further explore whether the power of punishment in norm 
enforcement in symmetric settings can carry over to asymmetric settings, and obtain an affirmative 
answer that punishment in heterogeneous populations shows similar or even higher effectiveness (e.g., 
Nikiforakis et al., 2010; Visser and Burns, 2006; Prediger, 2011). Reuben and Riedl (2013) examine 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 A closely related strand of literature focusing on identity conflict between two groups in general find favoritism 
toward ingroup members and discrimination against outgroup ones in terms of cooperation (e.g., Charness et al., 
2007; McLeish and Oxoby, 2007), coordination (e.g., Chen and Chen, 2011; Chen et al., 2010), social 
preferences (e.g., Chen and Li, 2009), and norm enforcement (e.g., Ruffle and Sosis, 2006; Bernhard et al., 2006; 
Goette et al., 2006; Goette et al., 2012).  
2 However, some other studies question the beneficial effects of punishment (Egas and Riedl, 2008; Houser et 
al., 2008; Abbink et al., 2010), and some even find anti-social punishment directed at relatively cooperative 
people (e.g., Herrmann et al., 2008; Nikiforakis, 2008; Cinyabuguma et al., 2006). 
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the emergence and enforcement of contribution norms (i.e., an absolute efficiency rule and several 
relative contribution rules) to public goods in homogeneous and heterogeneous groups, and attain 
different results depending on the availability of punishment.    
In this paper we study the three dimensions affecting team cooperation: identity, punishment, and 
income distribution. While identity and punishment have been shown to increase cooperation, the 
potential interaction and relative importance of these two means have not, to the best of our 
knowledge, been investigated. Clearly, when deciding on team incentives and organization, the 
relative importance and interaction between identity and punishment is central. One goal of the present 
paper is to provide some evidence on this issue. Our experimental design allows us to study all three 
dimensions in isolation and the interaction between them. In addition, there are only a few studies 
looking at the interaction between identity and punishment, but the results are inconclusive. Chen and 
Li (2009) find that individuals are less likely to punish an ingroup member for misbehavior, whereas 
McLeish and Oxoby (2007) find that unfair offers to ingroup members incur greater use of costly 
punishment than those to outgroup members.  
Moreover, although the effect of income distribution on team cooperation both in the absence and 
presence of punishment has been investigated, whether and how income distribution affects the role of 
identity has not. Thus, an additional goal of this paper is to demonstrate whether and how income 
distribution affects the function of identity and punishment, respectively, as a cooperation norm 
enforcement mechanism. We use a three-stage laboratory experiment to address these questions. At 
the first stage, a common identity is induced in the strong identity treatments via a face-to-face 
identity-building activity involving all subjects; this stage is absent in the weak identity treatments. At 
the second stage, subjects individually solve a quiz whose results indicate their differences in 
productivity. At the third stage, a two sub-stage repeated linear public good game framed as a team 
production problem following the design of Fehr and Gächter (2002) is played in fixed teams of four. 
At the first sub-stage, subjects are randomly assigned into teams. Each team member decides 
individually how to allocate an endowment between individual work and team work We distinguish 
two team income distribution environments: in one, endowment is homogenously distributed among 
team members irrespective of their differences in productivity; in the other, each member is given a 
different endowment according to her productivity ranking within the team, yet the total team 
endowment is the same as with homogenous endowment teams. To compare the difference in behavior 
with and without punishment, we add a second sub-stage in half of the treatments where the subjects 
are informed of each team member’s contribution to the team work and can reduce their earnings by 
assigning costly punishment points.  
The main results from the experiment are as follows. At the team level, when punishment is not 
possible, endowment heterogeneity negatively affects cooperation. However, strong identity can 
counteract this negative impact. The introduction of punishment successfully raises and sustains 
cooperation in all treatments, i.e., in both homogenous and heterogeneous teams and with weak and 
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strong identities. Cooperation is similar in all treatments with punishment, and so is the punishment 
inflicted. Within the heterogeneous teams, low endowment individuals always show the greatest 
degree of cooperation relative to endowment, and punish least intensively. Strong identity increases 
contribution rates at all endowment levels without punishment, but not with punishment. Nor does 
strong identity have any impact on punishment assignment at each endowment level.  
  
2. Experimental design  
The experiment uses a 2!2!2 design. In one dimension we vary the endowment distribution by giving 
subjects in a team the same or different endowment in order to create homogenous or heterogeneous 
teams. In the second, we make the strength of identity strong or weak by conducting or not conducting 
an identity-building activity. The third dimension concerns whether or not subjects have the 
opportunity to punish other team members. This generates eight different combinations of conditions, 
each of which is a treatment of the experiment as summarized in Table 1. The experiment is conducted 
in three stages. The first stage is an identity-building stage. The second stage is an endowment 
determination stage. The third stage is a repeated linear public good game.  
<Table 1 about here> 
The identity-building stage was included only in the four treatments with strong identity. A 
“human knot” game was played with all subjects in one session in another room before they entered 
the laboratory. Subjects stood shoulder to shoulder, in a circle, facing each other. First they were asked 
to form a knot by lifting both hands and reaching across the circle to hold the hands of two other 
subjects who were not standing directly beside them, left hand to left hand and right hand to right 
hand. After ensuring that a knot had been constructed, subjects were asked to untangle the knot to 
form one or a couple of circles without letting go of any hands. Anyone who let go of a hand was 
required to immediately grab the same hand again. The game lasted for approximately ten minutes 
regardless of whether or not the knot was successfully untangled. The reason for choosing such an 
identity-building activity was that it is a typical activity conducted in orientation or training programs 
in real-world organizations to promote mutual understanding, raise common objectives, and yield 
organizational belongingness among new members or members from different departments. 
Communication was allowed during the course of the game. The experimenters observed that the 
game sparked extensive communication among team members. After finishing the identity-building 
activity, the subjects were led to the laboratory. In the four treatments with weak identity, subjects 
entered the laboratory directly once everybody had arrived, yet they did have a chance to meet each 
other while waiting for the experiment to start.   
The rest of the experiment was conducted in the laboratory, where subjects were first seated in 
partitioned computer terminals and then given written instructions while the experimenter read the 
instructions aloud. At the second stage, subjects individually solved a six-minute quiz consisting of 20 
general knowledge questions. The quiz performance determined the endowment levels of subjects in 
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the heterogeneous teams for the public good game. That is, the more questions that were answered 
correctly, the higher the endowment level. The quiz was used to create feelings of entitlement over the 
endowment (see, e.g., Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985; Gächter and Riedl, 2005) and to justify the fairness 
of inequalities within the heterogeneous teams. To enable comparison across treatments, this stage was 
also conducted in the homogenous endowment treatments, although in this treatment the endowment 
levels were not affected by quiz performance. 
At the third stage, four subjects out of 24 in one session were randomly assigned to a team and 
played a public good game framed as a team production problem for 10 periods. The reason for using 
partner rather than stranger matching was that wanted to mimic the situation where people usually 
worked in relatively fixed teams and interacted repeatedly over a period of time.3 The subjects knew 
that their teams consisted of themselves and three other individuals, whereas their identities were kept 
anonymous throughout the experiment.  
At the beginning of each period, each subject was endowed with a fixed amount of experimental 
currency units (ECUs), !!. They decided simultaneously and without communication how to allocate 
the endowment between individual work and team work (i.e., the public good). By freely choosing an 
amount to contribute to the team work,!!!, where ! ! !! ! !!, the remaining endowment, !! ! !!, was 
automatically considered the allocation to the individual work. Each ECU that a subject kept for 
individual work generated one ECU for herself, whereas the payoff from the team work was 50% of 
the team’s total contribution. That is, the marginal per capita return (MPCR) from a contribution to the 
public good was equal to 0.5. In the heterogeneous teams, members were endowed with 80, 60, 40, 
and 20 ECUs, respectively, according to their quiz performance ranking within a team. In the 
homogenous teams, each member was endowed with 50 ECUs. Subject i’s period payoff was given by 
!!! ! !! ! !! ! !!! !!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 
In the treatments with punishment, a second sub-stage was added. Subjects were informed of the 
other team members’ proportion of endowment contributed, i.e., contribution rate, and were given the 
opportunity to punish each other.4 To punish, member ! could assign punishment points to member ! 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3  See Botelho et al. (2009) for a critical review of the experimental literature on partner and stranger matching. 
The authors further compare behavior under random strangers and perfect strangers matching (where subjects 
meet only once) in a public good experiment, and find a significantly lower proportion of subjects contributing 
in a random strangers than in a perfect strangers protocol.  
4 We reveal relative contribution rather than absolute contribution amount to preserve the anonymity of 
endowment levels and to prevent individual reputation building. We are aware of the possible different impacts 
posed by different feedback formats on cooperation and efficacy of punishment as pointed out by Nikiforakis 
(2010). The author considers three feedback formats – subjects receive information about each team member’s 
contribution, earnings, or both contribution and earnings before making punishment decisions – and finds that 
earnings feedback leads to significantly less cooperation and lower efficiency than contribution feedback. 
Nevertheless, this paper follows the most common format used in public goods experiments with peer 
punishment to adopt the contribution feedback. A potential drawback is that a relative contribution norm is 
exogenously imposed. Brekke et al. (2012) compare the cooperation effect of three ways of framing the decision 
variable in a multi-period threshold public goods experiment with unequally endowed participants: absolute 
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within the same team, !!", ! ! !. The punishment decisions were made simultaneously and without 
communication. However, punishment points were not costless. Each assigned punishment point cost 
the punished member 3 ECUs and the punishing member 1 ECU. Hence, subject!!’s payoff at the end 
of the period was given by  
!!! ! !!! ! !!"!!!!!!! ! !! !!"
!
!!!!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 
Equation (2) implies that a subject could have a negative payoff in a given period. To reduce the 
probability of this, we constrained the income reduction associated with received punishment to not 
exceed the income from the contribution sub-stage, i.e., ! !!"!!!!!!! ! !!!. In addition, a subject could 
at most distribute 25 points to each other team member, i.e., !!" ! !"! ! ! !!!!!!!! ! ! !!. Despite the 
restrictions, negative payoff could still occur in some extreme cases where subjects had little income 
from the contribution sub-stage, attracted considerable punishment, and also decided to punish 
heavily. Negative period payoff occurred in three out of 1,920 possible cases (192 subjects !10 
periods); these losses were covered by cumulative payments from previous periods. As is common in 
public goods experiments with punishment, each subject was also given a one-off lump-sum payment 
of 50 ECUs to pay for any total loss that might be incurred during the experiment. In our experiment, 
however, nobody incurred such a loss.  
The endowment distribution, the payoff functions, the duration of the experiment (10 periods), 
and the instructions were common knowledge to all participants in each treatment. Before the 
commencement of actual decision making, the subjects were required to answer control questions to 
ensure that they had understood the features of the game correctly. In the treatment without 
punishment, at the end of each period the subjects were informed of their team’s total contribution, 
their own income, and the contribution rates of other team members in the current period. In the 
treatments with punishment, at the end of each period the subjects were reminded of the income from 
the contribution sub-stage and the associated cost of the punishment points they had assigned. They 
were also informed of the punishment they received in total, the associated income reduction, as well 
as their final income from that period as given by (2). Each of the four subjects was randomly assigned 
an identification number from 1 to 4 to identify her actions in a given period, but to prevent the 
possibility of individual reputation formation the numbers were randomly shuffled across periods. 
The experiment was conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) in the experimental laboratory at 
Beijing Normal University in May and June 2011. This university is located in the center of Beijing 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
contributions, contributions relative to endowments, and amounts of endowments kept (i.e., in terms of the 
effects of contributions on final payoffs). They find no significant difference in absolute contribution amounts 
between the absolute and relative framings for both high and low endowment subjects at conventional levels. 
Their finding to some extent mitigates the norm imposing concern in our experiment. Moreover, we are aware of 
the different views on fair contribution rules. See Reuben and Riedl (2013) and Brekke et al. (2012) for detailed 
discussions. !
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and has approximately 20,000 full-time students. The subjects were recruited via announcements on a 
bulletin board system (BBS) and bulletin boards in teaching and accommodation buildings at the 
university. In total, we had observations from 384 subjects5, 48 for each treatment. All subjects were 
allowed to participate in only one session, and they did not know about any treatments other than the 
one in which they participated. To control for experimenter effect, the same two individuals, who were 
unknown to the participants, ran all sessions. To keep the outcome of the experiment anonymous, 
subjects were informed at the beginning that they would be paid confidentially and individually in 
another room and that they would leave the laboratory successively so that they would not meet and 
communicate with other subjects after completing the session. The final earnings from the experiment 
totaled the sum of the period payoffs at an exchange rate of 1 ECU to 0.1 Chinese yuan (CNY) plus a 
show-up fee of 10 CNY. The experiment lasted an average of about 76 (104) minutes in the treatments 
without (with) punishment, including above-described stages and a post-experimental survey covering 
questions on demographics, academic background, past donation behavior, and perceptions about their 
team in the experiment. The subjects on average earned 80.9 (94.6) CNY6 in the treatments without 
(with) punishment, including the show-up fee in all treatments and the lump-sum payment in the 
treatments with punishment. 
 
3. Behavioral hypotheses  
This section develops behavioral hypotheses on how income distribution and identity strength affect 
cooperation and punishment behavior based on theories and existing empirical evidence. Assuming 
that all people are rational and self-interested exclusively in their material payoffs, the standard 
economic model predicts that people will not contribute in a linear public good game, irrespective of 
the income distribution, saliency of identity or punishment opportunities. However, there is 
considerable experimental evidence that such a model fails to predict actual behavior under many 
circumstances, suggesting that people are motivated by other-regarding preferences and that concerns 
for fairness and reciprocity cannot be overlooked in social interactions.  
 
3.1 Contributions when punishment is not possible 
It is clear from the game theoretic prediction that endowment heterogeneity7 is completely irrelevant 
for contribution levels in a linear public good game, and previous experiments testing this prediction 
have obtained mixed results. The first hypothesis, which has been tested several times before, is thus:  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 All subjects were Chinese citizens and university students with various academic majors.!
6 The average exchange rate in May and June 2011 was 1USD=6.48 CNY. The average hourly wage for 
university students in Beijing at the time of the experiment was approximately 50 CNY. 
7!Apart from endowment heterogeneity, heterogeneity can also be represented by different demands for a public 
good, i.e., different MPCR of group members (e.g., Isaac and Walker, 1988; Fisher et al., 1995; Carpenter et al., 
2009), or different fixed lump-sum payments such as show-up fees (e.g., Anderson et al., 2008).    
!
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Hypothesis 1.1: Team average contribution rates will be the same in homogenous (Homo-Weak-
NoPunish) and heterogeneous (Hetero-Weak-NoPunish) teams when identity is weak and there is no 
punishment. 
One implication from social identity theory is that once an individual has gone through a 
cognitive change and emotional investment process to categorize herself as part of a unit with shared 
goals, values, and norms, her behavior tends to conform to the norms of that unit, which could lead to 
a higher degree of team cohesion and more effective teamwork (Lembke and Wilson, 1998). Recent 
research shows that inducing a salient common organizational or team identity has a positive impact 
on pro-social behavior. Hence, we expect the induced strong identity to enhance cooperation in 
homogeneous teams:  
Hypothesis 1.2: Team average contribution rate will be higher in homogenous teams with strong 
identity (Homo-Strong-NoPunish) than in homogenous teams with weak identity (Homo-Weak-
NoPunish) when there is no punishment. 
The effect of strong identity on cooperation has not been explored so far in a heterogeneously 
endowed team setting. However, provided that individual average endowment is the same in 
heterogeneous teams as in homogenous teams, we expect a similar effect of strong identity in 
heterogeneous teams: 
Hypothesis 1.3: Team average contribution rate will be higher in heterogeneous teams with strong 
identity (Hetero-Strong-NoPunish) than in heterogeneous teams with weak identity (Hetero-Weak-
NoPunish) when there is no punishment. 
A related question is if the inducement of a strong identity has different effects in homogenous 
and heterogeneous teams. There is no theory or evidence suggesting that the increase in contribution 
rates should be the same or different; hence, conditional upon that we cannot reject Hypothesis 1.1, we 
state the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1.4: Team average contribution rates will not differ between homogenous (Homo-Strong-
NoPunish) and heterogeneous (Hetero-Strong-NoPunish) teams when identity is strong and there is no 
punishment.  
In heterogeneous teams, the question is as well if low and high endowment subject contributes the 
same (in absolute or relative terms) or not. If subjects were inequity averse (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), 
then subjects with higher endowment would contribute a larger share of their endowment to the public 
good than low endowment subjects (Buckley and Croson, 2006). However, if individuals are trying to 
maximize the net benefits from mutual cooperation, lower endowment individuals have stronger 
incentives to contribute more proportionally, at least initially, to signal their intent to commit to 
cooperative behavior, hoping higher endowment individuals will reciprocate (Prediger, 2011). This is 
because the MPCR is the same across endowment levels; lower endowment subjects can realize 
greater net gains if everyone contributes. Existing evidence provides support for the latter argument 
(e.g., Buckley and Croson, 2006; Prediger, 2011). Hence, 
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Hypothesis 1.5: In heterogeneous teams, subjects with lower endowment will give more in relative 
terms than subjects with a higher endowment when identity is weak (Hetero-Weak-NoPunish) and 
there is no punishment.  
Are there reasons to believe that this would change with the inducement of a strong identity? 
Inducing a strong identity could strengthen the inequity aversion and hence increase the contributions 
of higher endowment subjects. At the same time, the potential envy from lower endowment subjects 
could be reduced, hence increasing their contributions; for example, Chen and Li (2009) show that 
participants show a 93% decrease in envy when matched with an in-group member than with an out-
group member. Since there are two potential effects that go in opposite directions, we do not have a 
definite hypothesis regarding contribution rates of low and high endowment subjects with strong 
identity.  
Concerning the effect of strong identity on contribution rates of subjects at each endowment level 
in heterogeneous teams, we would expect the positive impact at team average to carry over to the 
individual level:     
Hypothesis 1.6: Contribution rate of subjects at each endowment level will be higher in 
heterogeneous teams with strong identity (Hetero-Strong-NoPunish) than in heterogeneous teams with 
weak identity (Hetero-Weak-NoPunish) when there is no punishment. 
 
3.2 Contributions when punishment is possible 
A well-established finding from repeated public goods experiments is that the existence of peer 
punishment increases and sustains cooperation. Inequity-averse subjects who cooperate could be 
sufficiently upset by the payoff inequality so that they are willing to sanction the free riders even at 
their own cost (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).  Free rider could perceive the threat of punishment to be 
credible and thus would tend to cooperate (Fehr and Gächter, 2000a). We hence hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2.1: The introduction of peer punishment will increase team average contribution rates in 
both homogenous (Homo-Weak-NoPunish vs. Homo-Weak-Punish) and heterogeneous teams (Hetero-
Weak-NoPunish vs. Hetero-Weak-Punish) when identity is weak.   
What if identity is strong? The answer depends on the relative strengths of strong identity and 
punishment on contribution, and the potential interaction between the two. If strong identity increases 
contribution rates substantially, there is little room for an additional effect of introducing punishment. 
And vice versa, if the existence of punishment opportunities increases contribution rates substantially, 
there will be little effect of identity on contribution behavior. At the same time, there could be 
reinforcement between the two. Our hypotheses are that both punishment and strong identity affect 
contribution rates even in the presence of each other, thus  
Hypothesis 2.2: The introduction of peer punishment will increase team average contribution rates in 
both homogenous (Homo-Strong-NoPunish vs. Homo-Strong-Punish) and heterogeneous teams 
(Hetero-Strong-NoPunish vs. Hetero-Strong-Punish) when identity is strong.   
10 
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Hypothesis 2.3: Team average contribution rates in teams with strong identity (Homo-Strong-Punish 
and Hetero-Strong-Punish) will be higher than in teams with weak identity (Homo-Weak-Punish and 
Hetero-Weak-Punish) even with the introduction of peer punishment irrespective of endowment 
distribution.  
The empirical evidence on the difference in effects of punishment on contributions between 
homogenous and heterogeneous teams is scarce. Visser and Burns (2006) and Prediger (2011) do find 
that with punishment, relative cooperation is significantly higher in heterogeneously endowed groups, 
but there is no clear theoretical prediction. We therefore do not make any conjecture about team 
average contribution rates between homogenous and heterogeneous teams irrespective of identity 
strength.  
What differences regarding contribution rates of heterogeneously endowed individuals could one 
expect when punishment is introduced? Multiple underlying motives outlined previously, such as 
inequity aversion, reciprocity, net benefit maximization from mutual cooperation, envy, altruism, etc. 
may be at work, and how people punish norm violators will also affect their reactions in terms of 
contributions in the next period. It is difficult to conjecture whether and in which direction 
contribution rates will differ within the Hetero-Weak-Punish or Hetero-Strong-Punish treatments. 
Thus, we again do not derive any definite hypothesis. Since it is unclear how identity and punishment 
interplay, we do not hypothesize about the contribution rates of subjects at each endowment level in 
heterogeneous teams between strong and weak identities.   
 
3.3 Punishment behavior 
It has been well documented that a substantial fraction of subjects are willing to engage in costly 
punishment of free riders (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2000b; Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008; Anderson 
and Putterman, 2006; Carpenter, 2007). Negative emotions toward free riders triggered by payoff 
inequality (i.e., inequity aversion) is the main motive behind this altruistic punishment (Fehr and 
Gächter, 2002; Fuster and Meier, 2010). Will punishment behavior change if endowment becomes 
unequal? Based on the hypothesis that contributions will not differ between homogenous and 
heterogeneous teams, we hypothesize that there will be no difference in punishment assignment either: 
Hypothesis 3.1: Team average punishment assignment will not differ between homogenous and 
heterogeneous teams when identity is weak (Homo-Weak-Punish vs. Hetero-Weak-Punish) or strong 
(Homo-Strong-Punish vs. Hetero-Strong-Punish).  
The effect of identity on punishment behavior reflects how negative reciprocity works. Chen and 
Li (2009) find that individuals are forgiving to ingroup members for misbehavior, whereas McLeish 
and Oxoby (2007) find that unfair offers to ingroup members incur greater use of punishment than 
those to outgroup members. The contradictory directions do not lead us to a definite hypothesis 
regarding the difference in team average punishment point assignment between teams with weak and 
strong identity irrespective of endowment distribution.  
11 
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How will punishment behavior differ among individuals with heterogeneous endowments? On the 
one hand, lower endowment subjects face higher costs of sanctioning (including the direct cost of 
awarding punishment and the possible additional cost of retaliation) relative to their endowment than 
their higher endowment counterparts, which may lead to lower frequency and intensity of punishment 
(Visser and Burns, 2006; Prediger, 2011). On the other hand, if negative emotions are invoked by 
perceived unfairness of endowment inequality, although endowment distribution is justified by quiz 
performance, lower endowment subjects may punish higher endowment members more vehemently 
even when higher endowment subjects have contributed more (Prediger, 2011). An additional 
incentive for lower endowment subjects to assign more punishment is to discipline free riders and 
promote mutual cooperation through which they can obtain greater net gains (Visser and Burns, 2006; 
Prediger, 2011). Nevertheless, previous research shows similar punishment intensity among low and 
high endowment subjects (Visser and Burns, 2006; Prediger, 2011). We hence do not have a definite 
hypothesis. Given the indefinite conjecture of the effect of identity on team average punishment 
behavior, it is also hard to predict how strong identity will affect punishment behavior of subjects at 
each endowment level. 
 
4. Results 
In this section, we analyze the impact of endowment distribution and identity strength on contributions 
to the team work when punishment is absent and present, and on punishment behavior.   
 
4.1 Contributions when punishment is not possible 
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of average contribution rates over the 10 periods for all treatments. For 
the four treatments without punishment, consistent with previous experimental findings, average 
contributions start from 30% to 50% of subjects’ endowment. They all rise in the early periods and 
then decline, although the peaks appear at different points in time and the rates of change differ across 
treatments. As the experiment progresses, contribution rates in the Hetero-Weak treatment becomes 
substantially lower than those of the other three treatments without punishment. 
<Figure 1 about here> 
Table 2 reports the average contribution rates over all 10 periods depending on treatment (first 
row) and endowment level (last four rows). Throughout the paper, for team average, the unit of 
observation is team mean over all periods; for subject average, the unit of observation is subject mean 
over all periods. High, Second, Third, and Low refer to endowment levels with 80, 60, 40, and 20 
ECUs, respectively. In the four treatments without punishment, team average contribution rates in 
Homo-Weak, Homo-Strong, and Hetero-Strong are at least 50% higher than that in the Hetero-Weak 
treatment (see left panel first row). Comparisons among the last four entries within columns (2) and 
(4) suggest that average contribution rates vary among subjects with different endowment levels. 
Friedman two-way analysis of variance by ranks tests reject the null hypothesis that contribution rates 
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of different endowment levels are from the same population under either identity strength (p-
values<0.01).  
<Table 2 about here> 
Since individual cross-period differences and the data structure are not taken into consideration in 
the summary statistics, we turn to a formal statistical analysis by regressing individual contribution 
rate on treatment variables of the experiment. Since contribution rates range between zero and one in 
each period, i.e., truncated from both above and below, we use a double-censored tobit model. We also 
include team random effects to account for the interaction of team members across periods. We 
construct one dummy variable for each endowment distribution and identity strength combination, i.e., 
Hetero-Weak, Homo-Weak, Hetero-Strong, and Homo-Strong, equal to one if the observation comes 
from the respective treatment and zero otherwise. Period dummies are also included to control for time 
order effects. To investigate how contribution rates differ among subjects with different endowment 
levels and identity strengths in the heterogeneous teams, we use one separate binary dummy variable 
for each endowment level and identity strength combination, i.e., Weak-High, Weak-Second, Weak-
Third, Weak-Low, Strong-High, Strong-Second, Strong-Third, and Strong-Low. Hetero-Weak and 
Weak-Low are excluded from the regressions as the reference groups.   
Table 3 presents the regression results. Models (1) and (2) are estimated for the four treatments 
without punishment. Model (1) includes both homogenous and heterogeneous teams to investigate the 
aggregate treatment effect, and model (2) includes only heterogeneous teams to study the endowment 
effect. The top panel reports the average marginal effects of the independent variables.8 In model (1), 
when identity is weak, homogenous teams on average contribute 13.4 percentage points more than 
heterogeneous teams. This significant difference rejects Hypothesis 1.1, but is in line with the finding 
in Cherry et al. (2005). It might be explained by the perceived unfairness of endowment heterogeneity, 
which reduces the possibility for a team contribution norm to emerge. When identity becomes strong, 
the significant difference between homogenous and heterogeneous teams disappears, which means that 
we cannot reject Hypothesis 1.4 (see bottom panel (i)). This suggests that building a strong identity 
can counteract the negative impact of endowment heterogeneity on contributions. The bridging of the 
difference is because strong identity significantly and substantially increases contribution rates in 
heterogeneous teams (15.0 percentage points), but it does not have a significant effect on contributions 
in homogenous teams (see bottom panel (ii)). Thus we reject Hypothesis 1.2 but not 1.3.  
<Table 3 about here> 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Using McDonald and Moffitt (1980) decomposition, the marginal effect of contribution rates, !! !!! , is 
calculated as  !"! !! !!!!!!! ! ! !" !! !! !!!!!!!! ! ! !! ! !! ! ! !! ! ! ! ! !" ! ! !! ! ! !!! ! !"! !! !!!!!! !! !!!!!!! ! !!!"!! !! !!!!!!!!! ! !. 
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When breaking heterogeneous teams down to various endowment levels (model (2)), we observe 
that the marginal effects of the endowment level dummies under weak identity are negative and 
statistically significant, indicating that low endowment subjects on average always contribute the 
largest proportion of endowment compared to their team members with higher endowments under 
weak identity. Thus, we cannot reject Hypothesis 1.5.9 The result is in line with previous findings 
(e.g., Buckley and Croson, 2006; Prediger, 2011) and supports the net benefit maximization from 
mutual cooperation argument. That low endowment subjects also contribute relatively more in the 
Hetero-Strong treatment is interesting (see bottom panel (iii)-(v)). It is primarily this group that 
increases contribution rates when identity becomes strong compared to when it is weak (see marginal 
effect of Strong-Low). If we compare contribution rates of subjects at the three other endowment 
levels when identity is weak and strong (see bottom panel (vi)-(viii)), we only find a significant effect 
for the second endowment level, i.e., for this group the contribution rate is higher when identity is 
strong. This means that we cannot reject Hypothesis 1.6 for two out of four endowment levels. 
 
4.2 Contributions when punishment is possible  
In this section, we examine whether and how contribution behavior changes when peer punishment is 
introduced. Comparing team average contribution rates in each column between the left and right 
panel of Table 2 (first row), we find that contribution rates are drastically and significantly higher in 
the treatments with punishment for all endowment distribution and identity strength combinations 
(Mann-Whitney U test, p-value=0.024 for Homo-Weak; p-value=0.002 for Hetero-Weak; p-
value=0.002 for Homo-Strong; p-value=0.043 for Hetero-Strong). Consequently, we cannot reject 
Hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2. The same pattern can be found for subjects at the same endowment level 
when we compare the last four entries of column (2) with (6) and (4) with (8) (Mann-Whitney U test, 
all p-values<0.1). However, the magnitude of the increase varies considerably across treatments and 
endowment levels. The strong effect of punishment is not unique to our experiment. Other studies 
using partner matching with similar MPCR and punishment cost-effectiveness as ours obtain a similar 
increase in contribution rates when punishment is introduced (e.g., Herrmann et al., 2008; Reuben and 
Riedl, 2013). As shown in Figure 1, average contribution rates in the treatments with punishment are 
all at a higher level after a similar starting point as in the treatments without punishment, and overall 
appear to be increasing over time. The evolution of contribution rates follows a similar pattern among 
the four treatments with punishment except Homo-Strong, which outstands the others from the 
beginning of the experiment. The divergence between treatments with and without punishment over 
time confirms the general finding from the existing literature that the presence of punishment 
opportunities is effective in improving and sustaining cooperation. However, the average contribution 
rates do not reach the maximum possible level in any of the four treatments with punishment. The 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 However, it should be noted that the pattern is different if we look at absolute contribution amounts: higher 
endowment subjects always contribute a greater absolute amount.  
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proportion of full contributions are 40%, 35%, 47%, and 33% of the total observations in Homo-Weak, 
Hetero-Weak, Homo-Strong, and Hetero-Strong, respectively, suggesting that the contribution 
“ceiling” is not reached by the majority in any of the four treatments. Comparisons among the last four 
entries within columns (6) and (8) suggest that average contribution rates vary among subjects with 
different endowment levels. Friedman two-way analysis of variance by ranks tests reject the null 
hypothesis that contribution rates of different endowment levels come from the same population under 
either identity strength (p-values<0.01). 
Models (3) and (4) in Table 3 present the regression results for the four treatments with 
punishment. Model (3) includes both homogenous and heterogeneous teams, and model (4) includes 
only heterogeneous teams. The same model and specification as in the treatments without punishment 
are applied. In model (3), there is no statistically significant difference between homogenous and 
heterogeneous teams, or between weak and strong identity (see marginal effects of Homo-Weak, 
Hetero-Strong, and bottom panel (i)-(ii)).10 Thus, we can reject Hypothesis 2.3. These results are in 
sharp contrast to the findings for the treatments without punishment, where both endowment 
distribution and identity have significant effects. One possible explanation for why strong identity 
does not further raise contributions in either endowment distribution may be that peer punishment 
alone is effective enough to push contribution rates to a high level and a strong common identity will 
not exert any further influence. This finding suggests that under our experimental design, peer 
punishment dominates common identity when both are viable in the effect on cooperation 
enhancement.  
Regarding various endowment levels within heterogeneous teams (model (4)), we find that like in 
absence of punishment, low endowment subjects on average always contribute a significantly greater 
proportion of the endowment than subjects with higher endowments, under both weak and strong 
identities (see marginal effects of Weak-High, Weak-Second, and Weak-Third, and bottom panel (iii)-
(v), except (v), where the difference is insignificant at conventional levels).11 These results could 
hence be interpreted by similar motives as those underlying behavior in heterogeneous teams without 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 The finding of no difference in contribution rates among the four treatments with punishment may raise a 
concern that subjects contribute a high share anyway due to the presence of punishment and do not respond to 
different endowment distributions and identity strengths. Besides the proportion of full contributions in each 
treatment with punishment, we also look at a less restrictive concept of the “ceiling,” which is an arbitrarily high 
contribution rate but not 1. To test the presence of such a “ceiling effect” in contribution rates, we split the 
observations in the treatments with punishment into two subsamples – one with team average contribution rate 
above the median of each treatment and one below. The average contribution rate in the above median 
subsample is 0.89, 0.88, 0.93, and 0.86 for Homo-Weak, Hetero-Weak, Homo-Strong, and Hetero-Strong, 
respectively. These are rather high rates. We also rerun model (3) of Table 3 for each subsample separately. We 
find that in the below median subsample, the regression results are qualitatively identical to those in the full 
sample, whereas in the above median subsample the team average contribution rate in the Homo-Strong 
treatment is significantly higher than in the Hetero-Strong and Homo-Weak treatments at conventional levels. 
This suggests that subjects in the above median subsample respond to the treatments and do not contribute 
anyway at a high level, and the finding of no difference in contribution rates among the four endowment 
distribution and identity strength combinations is actually driven by the result from the below median subsample.    
11 Absolute contribution amounts are also always higher from higher endowment subjects. 
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punishment. However, strong identity does not exert a significant impact at any endowment level (see 
marginal effect of Strong-Low, and bottom panel (vi)-(viii)). We hence can reject Hypothesis 2.6 but 
not 2.5. 
 
4.3 Punishment behavior 
We now turn to the analysis of punishment behavior. Table 4 reports the average number of 
punishment points assigned by subject i to j in the same team depending on treatment and endowment 
level. The first row shows that the average number of punishment points allocated is around 0.5 out of 
a maximum of 25 in all four treatments. Punishment occurs in 1,071 out of 5,760 possible cases (196 
subjects times 3 targets per period times 10 periods), and boils down to 22% of 1,440 possible cases in 
Homo-Weak, 17% in Hetero-Weak, 19% in Homo-Strong, and 16% in Hetero-Strong. The last four 
entries in columns (2) and (4) demonstrate that there are some variations in punishment assignment 
across endowment levels within heterogeneous teams. Friedman two-way analysis of variance by 
ranks tests reject the null hypothesis that punishment points assigned by subjects of different 
endowment levels are from the same population under either identity strength (p-values<0.01).       
<Table 4 about here> 
Some regularities regarding punishment behavior have been identified from previous public goods 
experiments (see, e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2000b; Carpenter and Matthews, 2009; Nikiforakis et al., 
2010). In particular, punishment is mostly directed toward team members contributing less than the 
team average, and the severity of punishment increases with the difference between the contribution of 
the target and the team average. In order to investigate this, we conduct a regression analysis of 
punishment assignment behavior. To account for the large number of zero punishment and a handful 
of full punishment, we again apply the double-censored tobit model with team random effects. In 
addition to the treatment variables and period dummies, we include the following three independent 
variables in some of the regressions to capture the regularities in punishment behavior: others’ average 
contribution rate, absolute negative deviation, and positive deviation. Others’ average contribution 
rate is the average value of the team members’ contribution rates of subject j (i.e., !! !!!!!! !!), 
excluding that of subject j. Absolute negative deviation is the absolute value of the actual deviation of 
subject j’s contribution rate from the others’ average in case her own contribution is below the average 
(i.e., !"#!!! !! !!!!!!! ! !! !!!!). This variable is zero if the subject’s own contribution rate is equal or 
above the others’ average. Positive deviation (i.e., !"#!!! !! !!! ! ! !! !!!!!!! !!!) is constructed 
analogously. 12 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 We are aware of other possible punishment regularities within one’s own group such as that based on 
individual contribution comparison between the punisher and the target. That is, individuals often punish team 
members who contribute proportionally less than they do. Although we choose to follow the literature and use 
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Table 5 reports the regression results. Models (1) and (2) are estimated using both homogenous 
and heterogeneous teams, whereas models (3) and (4) only using heterogeneous teams. Models (1) and 
(3) only include treatment variables, whereas models (2) and (4) also account for the punishment 
regularities. The top panel reports the average marginal effects of the independent variables.13 In 
model (1), the model results indicate that there is no statistically significant difference in punishment 
assignment at team level between homogenous and heterogeneous teams (see marginal effect of 
Homo-Weak, and bottom panel (i)). Similar punishment levels across different endowment 
distributions support Hypothesis 3.1, and this is consistent with our previous finding that average 
contribution rates are similar as well. That punishment does not vary with identity strength (see 
marginal effect of Hetero-Weak and bottom panel (ii)) is at odds with the findings of both Chen and Li 
(2009) and McLeish and Oxoby (2007), indicating that negative reciprocity is not a motive affecting 
behavior in our sample. In model (2), when punishment regularities are accounted for, the treatment 
effects are generally the same as in model (1) (except bottom panel (i), which becomes marginally 
significant). The three regularity variables are all statistically significant with expected signs. The 
negative marginal effect of Others’ average contribution rate suggests that less punishment is used 
when a high common team contribution standard has already been established. The positive marginal 
effect of Absolute negative deviation and negative marginal effect of Positive deviation show that the 
extent of punishment increases (decreases) with the size of absolute negative (positive) deviation of 
the target’s from the others’ average contribution rate. Figure 2 provides some visual evidence for the 
above findings.              
<Table 5 about here> 
The patterns in punishment behavior discussed above are at an aggregate level for all four 
treatments with punishment. In order to check whether these patterns are common across treatments, 
we examine them separately for each treatment. Table 6 reports the regression results for tobit models 
with both upper and lower censoring and team random effects. Entries in the top panel are the average 
marginal effects of the independent variables. Following Goette et al. (2012), we test the equality of 
marginal effects across treatments in the bottom panel using two-sided z-tests for single parameter 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
the most commonly assumed punishment regularity since Fehr and Gächter (2000b) as based on team average 
contribution comparison, qualitatively similar results are obtained when we instead control for individual 
absolute negative deviation (i.e., ! "#!!! !! !!! ! !! !!!! ) and individual positive deviation 
(i.e.,! "#!!! !! !!! ! !! !!!!).    
13 Using McDonald and Moffitt (1980) decomposition, the marginal effect of punishment, !!!!, is calculated as  !" !! !!!! ! ! !" ! ! !! ! !"!!!!! ! ! !! !! ! ! !! ! !"  ! !" ! ! !! ! !"!! ! !"!!!!!! ! ! !! ! !"!!!! ! !!!"!!!! ! !"!!!!!! ! !" 
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comparison and !!-tests for parameter vector comparison.14 In all treatments, the marginal effect of 
Absolute negative deviation is positive and highly significant, i.e., the more an individual’s 
contribution rate falls below the others’ average, the more she gets punished. The tests comparing two 
marginal effects show no significant difference across treatments (see bottom panel (ii)). Others’ 
average contribution rate exerts a negative and significant effect in all treatments only except in 
Hetero-Weak, where the effect is not significant at conventional levels. However, the marginal effects 
do not differ between any endowment distribution and identity strength combinations (see bottom 
panel (i)). In contrast, Positive deviation has a significant negative impact only in the Homo-Strong 
treatment. It may hence be this result that drives the variable significance at the aggregate level in 
Table 5 column (2). Tests on the equality of !! show that subjects’ reaction to positive deviation 
differs significantly between the Homo-Strong and Hetero-Strong and between the Homo-Strong and 
Homo-Weak treatments (see bottom panel (iii)). This confirms the visual finding from Figure 2 that 
punishment level in Homo-Strong reduces to zero when positive deviation exceeds 0.4, whereas in the 
other three treatments punishment keeps at a low level for all positive deviation intervals. The 
difference in Positive deviation may also contribute to the overall difference in punishment patterns 
between the Homo-Strong and Hetero-Strong treatments (see bottom panel (iv)).   
<Table 6 about here> 
Models (3) and (4) of Table 5 present the regression results on punishment assignment by subjects 
with different endowment levels in the heterogeneous teams. In model (3), the marginal effects of the 
endowment level dummies under both weak and strong identities are positive and statistically 
significant, except the second level under weak identity (see marginal effects of Weak-High, Weak-
Second, and Weak-Third and bottom panel (iii)-(v)). This indicates that higher endowment subjects 
tend to use punishment more intensively than low endowment subjects. Our results contrast those in 
Visser and Burns (2006) and Prediger (2011), who find no significant difference between low and high 
endowment subjects. Thus, punishment decreases with the relative cost of sanctioning (see, e.g., 
Anderson and Putterman, 2006; Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008), and is not income inelastic which is 
in contrast with the findings in Carpenter (2007). Neither perceived unfairness of endowment 
heterogeneity nor expected net gains from mutual cooperation is a motivation underlying our results. 
Similar to at team average level, strong identity does not have a significant impact on punishment at 
any endowment level (see bottom panel (vi)-(viii)). When punishment regularities are accounted for 
(model (4)), punishment assignment responds to Others’ average contribution rate and to Absolute 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 For single parameter tests, we calculate ! !!!!!!!!!!!! , where !! and !! are the two parameters of interest from 
the two regressions, and !!! and !!! are the corresponding main diagonal elements in the variance-covariance 
matrix. Since the two parameters come from two separate regressions, their covariance by construction is zero. z 
follows a standard normal distribution under the null of equality. For parameter vector tests, we calculate the 
analogous test statistic !! ! ! ! ! !!! ! !!!! ! ! ! , where ! is a column vector. !! follows a Chi-squared 
distribution with k degrees of freedom, where k is the number of variables in !.    
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negative deviation in a similar fashion as that in the pooled sample with both homogenous and 
heterogeneous teams. However, Positive deviation does not have a significant impact on the size of 
punishment in heterogeneous teams, which is consistent with the results (!!) in columns (2) and (4) of 
Table 6.           
 
5.  Conclusions 
How to foster cooperation in organizations when free-riding incentives prevail and individual 
members are diverse in for example ability and motivation is an important economic problem. In this 
paper, we have investigated the relative importance of identity and punishment under homogenous and 
heterogeneous income distributions on contribution rates to a team public good. There are three key 
findings. First, when punishment is not possible, endowment heterogeneity negatively affects 
cooperation, yet strong identity can counteract this negative impact. However, strong identity does not 
have any effect on cooperation in homogenous teams. One possible explanation for this difference is 
that contribution rates are already very high in homogenous teams, and therefore the impact of a 
strong identity is weakened. This finding complements the literature of induced identity by showing 
that not only the saliency of identity matters for its effect on cooperation, but only when the level of 
cooperation is sufficiently low. Second, the introduction of punishment successfully raises and 
sustains cooperation in both homogenous and heterogeneous teams, and under both weak and strong 
identities. Moreover, cooperation behavior is similar across all treatments with punishment, and so is 
the punishment inflicted. Thus, the effect of punishment is so strong that identity and income 
distribution play no role under our experimental design. Third, within the heterogeneous teams, lower 
endowment individuals contribute more in relative terms but less in absolute terms, and they punish 
less and hence receive greater net gains, which to some extent equalizes the ex ante endowment 
inequality through repeated interactions.   
This study should be viewed as a first step toward considering the interactive effects of income 
distribution, identity, and punishment on cooperation. A natural extension would be to conduct the 
same experiment with real employees from real-world workplaces to test the external validity of our 
results. Moreover, our findings on identity strength might depend on the design method used, i.e., 
induced identity, and on the activity used to induce identity. It would be interesting to use natural 
identities within existing social groups or primed natural social identities, such as gender, ethnicity, 
and different household registration types to study the same issues.  
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Table 1. Experimental treatments 
Treatment Endowment distribution Identity Punishment 
Homo-Weak-NoPunish Homogenous Weak No 
Hetero-Weak-NoPunish Heterogeneous Weak No 
Homo-Strong-NoPunish Homogenous Strong No 
Hetero-Strong-NoPunish Heterogeneous Strong No 
Homo-Weak-Punish Homogenous Weak Yes 
Hetero-Weak-Punish Heterogeneous Weak Yes 
Homo-Strong-Punish Homogenous Strong Yes 
Hetero-Strong-Punish Heterogeneous Strong Yes 
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Table 2. Average contribution rates across treatments 
  Without punishment   With punishment 
 
Homo-
Weak 
Hetero-
Weak 
Homo-
Strong 
Hetero-
Strong  
Homo-
Weak 
Hetero-
Weak 
Homo-
Strong 
Hetero-
Strong 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Average 0.46 0.31 0.50 0.46  0.69 0.67 0.79 0.67 
 (0.22) (0.16) (0.16) (0.22)  (0.25) (0.25) (0.17) (0.25) 
High  0.27  0.38   0.65  0.63 
  (0.21)  (0.26)   (0.27)  (0.26) 
Second  0.25  0.42   0.63  0.61 
  (0.14)  (0.27)   (0.27)  (0.30) 
Third  0.32  0.46   0.68  0.72 
  (0.20)  (0.24)   (0.27)  (0.26) 
Low  0.39  0.59   0.74  0.73 
    (0.29)   (0.26)     (0.27)   (0.28) 
Notes: The table reports the average contribution rates depending on treatment (first row) and endowment level 
(last four rows) in heterogeneous endowment treatments. Standard deviations in parentheses.   
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Table 3. Determinants of contribution rates 
Dependent variable: contribution rate of subject i in period t, !! !!!   
 Without punishment With punishment 
 Homo & Hetero Hetero only Homo & Hetero Hetero only 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Homo-Weak 0.134*  0.031  
 (0.069)  (0.084)  
Hetero-Strong 0.150**  0.00008  
 (0.069)  (0.086)  
Homo-Strong 0.175**  0.116  
 (0.069)  (0.078)  
Weak-High  -0.118***  -0.099*** 
  (0.030)  (0.027) 
Weak-Second  -0.141***  -0.121*** 
  (0.031)  (0.028) 
Weak-Third  0.068**  -0.059** 
  (0.031)  (0.026) 
Strong-High  -0.008  -0.115 
  (0.078)  (0.088) 
Strong-Second  0.022  -0.132 
  (0.079)  (0.088) 
Strong-Third  0.056  -0.034 
  (0.079)  (0.083) 
Strong-Low  0.200**  0.002 
  (0.078)  (0.080) 
Observations 1920 960 1920 960 
Wald Chi2 211.05*** 155.48*** 338.09*** 228.94*** 
Log-likelihood -843.76 -405.60 -758.10 -354.82 
Left censored observations 262 145 37 27 
Right censored observations 185 93 746 325 
Linear combination of the model marginal effects:    
(i) (Homo-Strong) - (Hetero-Strong) 0.025  0.116  
 (0.072)  (0.078)  
(ii) (Homo-Strong) - (Homo-Weak) 0.041  0.085  
 (0.072)  (0.076)  
(iii) (Strong-High) - (Strong-Low)  -0.208***  -0.117*** 
  (0.031)  (0.027) 
(iv) (Strong-Second) - (Strong-Low)  -0.178***  -0.134*** 
  (0.032)  (0.028) 
(v) (Strong-Third) - (Strong-Low)  -0.144***  -0.036 
  (0.032)  (0.025) 
(vi) (Strong-High) - (Weak-High)  0.110  -0.016 
  (0.074)  (0.093) 
(vii) (Strong-Second) - (Weak-Second) 0.163**  -0.010 
  (0.074)  (0.095) 
(viii) (Strong-Third) - (Weak-Third)  0.124  0.025 
    (0.077)   (0.087) 
Notes: The table reports the regression results for a tobit model with both upper and lower censoring and team 
random effects. Models (1) and (2) are estimated for the treatments without punishment, and models (3) and (4) 
with punishment. Models (1) and (3) are run on both homogenous and heterogeneous treatments, whereas 
models (2) and (4) are run on heterogeneous treatments only. Entries in the topmost panel are the average 
marginal effects of the independent variables. Period dummies are controlled in the regressions, but the results 
are not shown here. The bottom panel shows the linear combination of the model marginal effects. Standard 
errors in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level.  
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Table 4. Average number of punishment points assigned across treatments 
  Homo-Weak Hetero-Weak Homo-Strong Hetero-Strong 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Average 0.53 0.47 0.46 0.36 
 (0.36) (0.44) (0.32) (0.41) 
High  0.68  0.30 
  (1.06)  (0.34) 
Second  0.33  0.57 
  (0.24)  (0.80) 
Third  0.46  0.37 
  (0.50)  (0.69) 
Low  0.41  0.20 
    (0.67)   (0.19) 
Note: The table reports the average punishment points assigned by subject i to j depending on treatment (first 
row) and endowment level (last four rows) in heterogeneous endowment treatments. Standard deviations in 
parentheses.  
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Table 5. Determinants of punishment 
Dependent variable: punishment points assigned from subject i to j in period t, !!"!!  
 Homo & Hetero Hetero only   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Homo-Weak 0.158 0.157   
 (0.161) (0.111)   Hetero-Strong -0.051 -0.068   
 (0.135) (0.090)   Homo-Strong 0.049 0.126   
 (0.148) (0.110)   Weak-High   0.292*** 0.374*** 
   (0.101) (0.087) Weak-Second   0.053 0.092 
   (0.073) (0.062) Weak-Third   0.153* 0.160** 
   (0.083) (0.067) Strong-High   0.036 0.053 
   (0.135) (0.091) Strong-Second   0.287* 0.373*** 
   (0.173) (0.126) 
Strong-Third   0.075 0.033 
   (0.141) (0.089) Strong-Low   -0.094 -0.108 
   (0.116) (0.074) Others’ average contribution rate  -0.595***  -0.525*** 
  (0.111)  (0.140) Absolute negative deviation  2.478***  2.289*** 
  (0.192)  (0.251) Positive deviation  -0.257**  -0.145 
  (0.119)  (0.146) Observations 5760 5760 2880 2880 
Wald Chi2 156.66*** 934.42*** 91.23*** 402.97*** 
Log-likelihood -4538.22 -4033.86 -2047.19 -1821.40 
Left censored observations 4689 2406 
Right censored observations 2 1 
Linear combination of the model marginal effects:    
(i) (Homo-Strong) - (Hetero-Strong) 0.100 0.194*   
 (0.142) (0.105)   (ii) (Homo-Strong) - (Homo-Weak) -0.109 -0.031   
 (0.167) (0.123)   (iii) (Strong-High) - (Strong-Low)   0.130* 0.160*** 
   (0.071) (0.058) (iv) (Strong-Second) - (Strong-Low)   0.381*** 0.480*** 
   (0.108) (0.093) (v) (Strong-Third) - (Strong-Low)   0.169** 0.141** 
   (0.077) (0.055) (vi) (Strong-High) - (Weak-High)   -0.256 -0.321** 
   (0.177) (0.130) (vii) (Strong-Second) - (Weak-Second)  0.234 0.281** 
   (0.178) (0.132) (viii) (Strong-Third) - (Weak-Third)   -0.078 -0.127       (0.162) (0.105) 
Notes: The table reports the regression results for a tobit model with both upper and lower censoring and team 
random effects. Models (1) and (2) are estimated on both homogenous and heterogeneous treatments, whereas 
models (3) and (4) on heterogeneous treatments only. Models (1) and (3) only include treatment variables, 
whereas models (2) and (4) also include punishment regularity variables. Entries in the top panel are the average 
marginal effects of the independent variables. Period dummies are controlled in the regressions, but the results 
are not shown here. The bottom panel shows the linear combination of the model marginal effects. Standard 
errors in parentheses. *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level. 
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Table 6. Response to punishment regularities by treatment 
Dependent variable: punishment points assigned from subject i to j in period t, !!"!! 
  Homo-Weak Hetero-Weak Homo-Strong Hetero-Strong 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Others’ average contribution rate (!!) -0.572*** -0.342 -0.807*** -0.720*** 
 (0.206) (0.218) (0.313) (0.226) 
Absolute negative deviation (!!) 2.546*** 2.520*** 2.813*** 2.004*** 
 (0.349) (0.457) (0.466) (0.317) 
Positive deviation (!!) -0.271 -0.044 -1.252*** -0.142 
 (0.236) (0.234) (0.415) (0.188) 
Observations 1440 1440 1440 1440 
Wald Chi2 293.19*** 174.87*** 304.63*** 196.16*** 
Log-likelihood -1142.52 -991.01 -997.65 -859.81 
Left censored observations 1120 1196 1163 1210 
Right censored observations 0 0 1 1 
Tests across treatments:      
 
Homo-Weak = 
Hetero-Weak 
Homo-Strong = 
Hetero-Strong 
Homo-Weak = 
Homo-Strong 
Hetero-Weak = 
Hetero-Strong 
(i) Test that !! differs p= 0.442 p= 0.821 p= 0.531 p= 0.229 
(ii) Test that !! differs p= 0.963 p= 0.151 p= 0.647 p= 0.354 
(iii) Test that !! differs p= 0.495 p= 0.015 p= 0.040 p= 0.744 
(iv) Test that !!, !!, and !! differ P= 0.832 p= 0.024 p= 0.226 p= 0.228 
Notes: The table reports the regression results for a tobit model with both upper and lower censoring and team 
random effects. Each model is estimated for one treatment with the treatment name specified as the column 
heading. Entries in the top panel are the average marginal effects of the independent variables. Period dummies 
are controlled in the regressions, but the results are not shown here. The bottom panel shows cross-treatment test 
results. p-values in cross-treatment tests are all two-sided. Standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates 
significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level.  
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Figure 1. Evolution of average contribution rates across treatments 
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Figure 2. Average punishment points assigned to subject j by treatment and by category of 
deviation in contribution rate of subject j from the average of other team members 
 
 
